Humans explain and predict other agents' behavior using mental state concepts, such as beliefs and desires. Computational and developmental evidence suggest that such inferences are enabled by a principle of rational action: the expectation that agents act efficiently, within situational constraints, to achieve their goals. Here we propose that the expectation of rational action is instantiated by a naïve utility calculus sensitive to both agent-constant and agent-specific aspects of costs and rewards associated with actions.
a b s t r a c t
Humans explain and predict other agents' behavior using mental state concepts, such as beliefs and desires. Computational and developmental evidence suggest that such inferences are enabled by a principle of rational action: the expectation that agents act efficiently, within situational constraints, to achieve their goals. Here we propose that the expectation of rational action is instantiated by a naïve utility calculus sensitive to both agent-constant and agent-specific aspects of costs and rewards associated with actions.
In four experiments, we show that, given an agent's choices, children (range: 5-6 year olds; N = 96) can infer unobservable aspects of costs (differences in agents' competence) from information about subjective differences in rewards (differences in agents' preferences) and vice versa. Moreover, children can design informative experiments on both objects and agents to infer unobservable constraints on agents' actions.
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Introduction
One of the assumptions underlying our ability to draw rich inferences from sparse data is that agents act rationally. In its simplest form, this amounts to the expectation that agents will take the shortest path to a goal subject to physical constraints imposed by the world (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) . Even this simple formulation is inferentially powerful, supporting predictions about future events and inferences about unobserved aspects of events. For instance, if Sally hops over a wall to get a cookie, we assume that she would not hop, but walk straight to the cookie, if the wall were not there. Studies suggest that even infants expect agents to act rationally. Infants can use information about an agent's goal and situational constraints (e.g., gaps, occluders, walls, etc.) to develop expectations about her actions (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995) ; an agent's actions and situational constraints to form expectations about her goals (Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003) , and an agent's actions and goals to reason about unobserved situational constraints (see Csibra et al., 2003 for review; see also Brandone & Wellman, 2009; Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Phillips & Wellman, 2005; Schwier, Van Maanen, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006; Scott & Baillargeon, 2013) .
Computationally, goal inference using the principle of rational action can be formalized as finding the agent's unobservable utility function (a function that describes the utility the agent receives in each possible state of the world).
1 Borrowing from frameworks widely used in artificial intelligence and other engineering fields (e.g., Markov Decision Processes), it is possible to determine the actions a rational (or efficient) agent should take to maximize a utility function, given the environmental constraints. 
